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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Church and his younger brother Casey were arrested
and arraigned on Friday, August 10, 1974, on charges of aiding and
abetting the prison escape of their older brother, Kelly.I Police detec-
tives read Michael his Miranda) warnings and attempted to question
him about a recent unrelated murder.3 The suspect, however, refused
to discuss the offense.4 The following morning, the detectives con-
tacted Michael's court appointed attorney and requested permission
to question Michael about the murder. The attorney instructed the
detectives not to speak with his client until Monday morning when he
would have the opportunity to consult with his client. The detectives
agreed to wait until after the weekend to interrogate Church.5
1. United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1017 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that the accused:
[M]ust be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
Id. at 479.
3. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
4. United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, No. 83 C 4512, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill.
June 14, 1984).
5. Id. at 3; People v. Church, 102 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158, 429 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1981).
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That night, the police arrested Kelly on the escape charge.6 The
police told Kelly that Casey had a "lot of heavy stuff to lay on him ' 7
and placed him in Casey's cell. On Sunday morning, Kelly told the
police that if they put him in Michael's cell, he would persuade
Michael to make a statement.8 That evening, the police placed Kelly
in Michael's cell knowing that he would attempt to elicit a statement
from his younger brother.9 Kelly told Michael to make a statement in
order to get Casey out of trouble.' 0 Late that night, Kelly called the
jailer to notify the detectives that Michael wished to speak with the
detectives." Once the detectives arrived, Michael stated that he
would talk to them. 12 The detectives did not inform Michael that his
attorney had instructed them not to question him about the murder.
Moreover, the officers did not tell Michael that the attorney planned
to meet with him the next morning about the murder.' 3 Michael
received the Miranda warnings and stated that he did not want an
attorney.'4 The officers did not question Michael, but left him with
pencil and paper with which Michael wrote an eleven page
confession. 15
Michael Church was indicted and convicted for murder and
armed violence.' 6 On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in
admitting his handwritten eleven page confession because he had not
The attorney did not know he was representing Michael until the detective contacted him on
Saturday morning. Church, No. 83 C 4512, slip op. at 3.
6. Kelly was arrested in the home of his parents. The parents were quite worried about
Casey Church because he had never before been incarcerated. Kelly assured his parents that
he would find out why Casey was in trouble. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017; Church, No. 83 C
4512, slip op. at 3-4.
7. Church, No. 83 C 4512, slip op. at 4. According to the officer, his comment to Kelly
referred to Casey's alleged involvement in the murder. Id.
8. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant at 6 n.*, United States ex rel. Church v.
De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985). Michael was not present during this discussion.
The brief paraphrases this undisputed fact from the unpublished memorandum opinion of the
district court. Church, No. 83 C 4512, slip op. at 21. There was some controversy surrounding
the events of the case. See infra note 80.
9. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
10. Id.
11. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant at 6 n.**, Church.
12. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
13. Id. at 1018.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of forty years on each count
after a jury trial in the Illinois Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-
Appellant at 2, Church. Before trial, Church filed a motion to suppress his handwritten
confession. He argued that he had not effectively waived his right to remain silent and thus
was denied effective assistance of counsel. To support his proposition, Church relied on
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The trial court denied the suppression motion,
holding that Massiah, a sixth amendment case, was inapplicable because Church's sixth
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effectively waived his right to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during the "custodial interrogation" that the police con-
ducted. Further, Michael claimed that the state denied him effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney was not present when he
wrote the confession. 1 7 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the con-
viction1 8 and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 19
Church then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal dis-
trict court. The district court denied Church's motion for an eviden-
tiary hearing and summary judgment finding that he had exhausted
all claims raised in his habeas corpus action.20 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the confession was admissi-
ble. The court reasoned that the police's conduct in placing Michael
in a jail cell with his brother, who the police knew would elicit a state-
ment from the suspect, did not constitute a custodial interrogation.
Moreover, because a custodial interrogation did not occur, neither the
police's failure to inform Michael that his attorney planned to meet
with him the next morning nor their failure to contact the attorney
before Church made his statement rendered the confession invalid.
United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.
1985).
In Miranda v. Arizona,2 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the prosecution cannot use a suspect's statements elicited
during a custodial interrogation in a criminal trial unless the state has
provided certain procedural safeguards to protect the suspect's fifth
amendment rights.22 This note examines the Church decision in light
of these procedural safeguards. First, it will examine what constitutes
amendment rights had not attached with regard to the murder charge. People v. Church, No.
79-CF-195 (I11. 1 lth Jud. Cir. May 8, 1980) (order denying motion to suppress).
17. People v. Church, 102 Ill. App. 3d 155, 161, 429 N.E.2d 577, 582 (1981).
18. Id. at 168, 429 N.E.2d at 587. The court held that "[lthe right to counsel is a personal
one inhering in the accused ... that [when] retained counsel is not notified of his client's choice
to forego assistance does not invalidate an otherwise valid waiver." Id. at 161, 429 N.E.2d at
582. Relying on Brewer v. Williams, a sixth amendment waiver case, the state appellate panel
further held that the state met its heavy burden of proving Church's intentional relinquishment
and abandonment of his known right. People v. Church, 102 II1. App. 3d at 162, 429 N.E.2d
at 582 (relying on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)). Finally, the court noted that the
detective lacked candor in withholding the fact that Church's appointed counsel had
instructed the police not to question him. Nevertheless, the detective's inaction was not "likely
to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (formulating
test to determine whether a custodial interrogation had occurred for fifth amendment
purposes).
19. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Church.
20. United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, No. 83 C 4512, slip op. at 2, 45 (N.D. Ill.
June 14, 1984); Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Church.
21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. Id. at 479; see supra note 2.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
a custodial interrogation and apply the tests and policy rationales
associated with Miranda and its progeny to the factual circumstances
in Church. The author then promotes an additional fifth amendment
safeguard designed to close the loophole in the current standards that
permits the police to employ a "dupe" to elicit a statement from a
suspect. Finally, the note explores an issue, which the Supreme Court
recently addressed, that Church left unresolved. Here, the author
comments on the validity of a fifth amendment waiver when the
police do not inform a suspect that they have agreed to refrain from




The fifth amendment provides that a criminal suspect may not be
forced to incriminate himself.23 In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren
warned against the privacy associated with police questioning proce-
dures.24 He found that privacy often leads to secrecy, and secrecy to
compulsion. The Chief Justice was concerned that psychological
interrogation methods and police trickery would result in involuntary
confessions. He concluded that without procedural warnings, the
compelling nature of an in-custody interrogation could easily over-
bear an individual's will to resist compulsion.25
The Court sought to overcome the subtle coercion resulting from
custodial interrogation by requiring law enforcement personnel to
inform suspects of their fifth amendment rights before questioning. In
protecting the "evidentiary value of confessions or inculpatory state-
ments,"26 the safeguards sought to ensure the voluntary nature of a
suspect's statements. Without the safeguards, a court could not be
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 457-58. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "No
person shall... be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
25. Id. at 479. Chief Justice Warren conducted a comprehensive analysis of police
interrogation methods and procedures in order to understand the custodial interrogation
atmosphere. He found that most questioning took place in discrete, private circumstances. He
learned that the strategy of interrogators was to "keep the subject off balance... [and] then to
persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights." Id. at 455. See also
Moran v. Burbine, 54 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4270-80 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id. at 458. For an excellent illustration of the type of environment that may lead to
coercion, see United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 40:833
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assured that a confession was the product of a free choice.27
The majority defined custodial interrogation as "questioning ini-
tiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way."' 28  Courts must analyze the complete facts of the case
before determining whether the defendant's statements were the prod-
uct of a custodial interrogation.29
Essentially, a court must conduct a two part test to determine the
presence of custodial interrogation. First, the court must determine
whether the accused was in custody or deprived of his freedom in a
significant way.3" In California v. Beheler,3' the Supreme Court
sought to clarify the custody standard. The Court held that the ulti-
mate inquiry for the purposes of receiving Miranda warnings "is sim-
ply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. ' 32
In the second phase of its analysis, a court must determine
whether there was an interrogation.3 3 Here, the question is: Did the
police's attempt to elicit information from the suspect rise to the level
of express questioning? The Supreme Court sharpened the definition
of interrogation in Rhode Island v. Innis.34 The Court held that the
27. Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial
Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REV. 699, 702 (1974).
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. See also Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and
Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 50 (1978) (Miranda
protects against police compulsion created by police questioning).
29. United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982) (crucial factual
determination must be made in light of all circumstances in case).
30. The Miranda Court defined custody as incarceration or deprivation of freedom in any
significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In Orozco v. Texas, the Court expanded the
meaning of custody by applying Miranda to a person under arrest in his own home. 394 U.S.
324 (1969).
In Oregon v. Mathiason, the Court held that police are required to give Miranda warnings
only where there has been such a restriction of freedom as to render the accused "in custody."
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). The Court held that a suspect was not in custody
where he voluntarily came to a police station for questioning and was allowed to depart
without restriction. Id. at 495. The Court implied that custody leads to the coercive
atmosphere to which Miranda applies. Id.
31. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam). See also Project, Fourteenth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-1984, 73 GEO.
L.J. 225, 373 & nn.671-79 (1984) (courts use different tests to determine whether suspect is in
custody for fifth amendment purposes); Project, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure. United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1982-1983, 72 GEO. L.J. 249,
340-41 & nn.592-600 (1983).
32. Id. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
34. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, three different police officers administered the Miranda
warnings to the suspect after his arrest. The suspect stated that he understood his rights and
wanted to speak with an attorney. Id. at 293-94. Once he invoked his rights, Innis was placed
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Miranda protections apply "whenever a person in custody is subjected
to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."35 Accord-
ing to the Innis majority, the use of custodial interrogation in
Miranda "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
associated with arrest and/or custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect."' 36 In determining whether police conduct constituted the func-
tional equivalent of express questioning, the Innis test37 examines the
in a caged van with two police officers who were instructed not to question, intimidate or
coerce him in any way. Id. at 294. During the ride to police headquarters, Innis overheard the
conversation of the two officers. The officers spoke of the danger that the lost murder weapon
would pose to young handicapped children in the area. Id. at 294-95. Innis became concerned
about the safety of the children and eventually told the officers that he would show them where
the weapon was located. Once again, the officers administered the Miranda warnings to Innis
and he then led the officers to the weapon. Id. at 295. Innis was convicted of murder. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the conviction, holding that the conversation about
the dangerous weapon violated the suspect's rights. The court stated that Innis had been
subjected to "subtle coercion" that was essentially equivalent to custodial interrogation. Id. at
296. Hence, the officers had violated his fifth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 296-97. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the state court holding that the police did not
interrogate Innis. Id. at 302-03.
35. Id. at 300-01.
36. Id. at 301. In United States v. Thierman, the court held that an officer's discussion of
possible consequences of a suspect's failure to cooperate did not constitute interrogation even
though one officer "guessed" he was attempting to get the suspect to respond. 678 F.2d 1331,
1333-34 (9th Cir. 1982). See also United States v. Bailey, 728 F.2d 967, 969-70 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2686 (1984) (no interrogation where officer passively listened to bulk of
conversation that defendant initiated).
37. There have been several interpretations of the Innis test. I W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 491-94 (1984); White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island
v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1231-32 (1980). Professor White
suggests an "objective" approach. Under his theory, interrogation exists when a policeman
should realize that the suspect will view his actions as designed to elicit an incriminating
response. Id. at 1231-32.
Professor White adds two caveats to the objective test. First, the objective observer's
analysis will be dependent upon the extent of his knowledge of police interrogation tactics.
Second, if the police are not aware of a suspect's "peculiar characteristics," the suspect may
comprehend the police conduct differently than would the objective observer. Id. at 1235
n.162. Thus, any knowledge the police may have concerning the unusual susceptibility of a
defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor for a court to
consider. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. To determine whether an interrogation has taken place,
Professor White asks whether "an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect
as the police officer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer that the
remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response." White, supra note 37, at 1232.
Professor Kamisar would view the atmosphere of police questioning from the suspect's
perspective.
In the "jail plant" or other "undercover" situations, however, there is no
integration of "custody" and "interrogation," . . . at least . . . in the suspect's
mind. So far as the suspect is aware, he is not "surrounded by antagonistic
forces"; "[t]he presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the
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actions and peculiarites of the suspect and, simultaneously considers
the intent of the police.38 Determination of the police officer's intent
assists the court in deciding whether the officer "should have known
that [his] words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incrimi-
nating response."39
In Berkemer v. McCarty,'° the Court appears to have developed a
suspect-oriented test to determine whether a person has been induced
to speak during police questioning. The test examines a suspect's
expectations during police interrogation. The Court found that in cer-
tain interactions with the police, individuals do not believe that they
are solely at the mercy of the officers. 41 Rather, certain interchanges
reduce "the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate
means to elicit self-incriminating statements and [diminish] the [sus-
pect's] fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to
abuse."'41 If the suspect, therefore, does not believe he is under com-
pulsion or in custody Miranda does not come into play. Indeed,
Miranda rights have been held inapplicable in situations where a sus-
pect made incriminating statements while the police were eavesdrop-
ping from a distant place43 and in jail plant cases.'
individual" are not needed to "enable [him] under otherwise compelling
circumstances to tell his story . . . in a way that eliminates the evils in the
interrogation process."...
So far as the suspect is aware, his fellow prisoner neither controls his fate,
nor has a professional interest in his case .... [H]is fellow prisoner does not care
whether he confesses. . . . Moreover, even if the fellow prisoner did care, and
cared a great deal, there is no reason to think that he possesses the power over
the suspect or the necessary skills and training to press demands and to weary the
suspect with contradictions of his assertions until the case "is brought to a
definite conclusion."
Kamisar, supra note 28, at 64-65 (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
See also Note, What Constitutes Interrogation?: Rhode Island v. Innis, 22 B.C.L. REV.
1177, 1181 (1977) (Miranda views interrogation environment from suspect's perspective).
38. Courts will focus on the perceptions of the suspect in determining whether police
action is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Cf. United States v. Booth, 669
F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981) (intent of the police is relevant). See also W. LA FAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 37, at 499-501, 510 (discussing the functional equivalent test).
39. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.7.
40. 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
41. Id. at 3150.
42. Id.
43. W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 37, at 513-14 (police eavesdropping of suspect's
jail cell is not interrogation).
44. United States v. Surridge, 687 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044
(1982) (no affirmative police duty to prevent a person from providing assistance as long as no
police direction, control or involvement). But cf White, Police Trickery in Inducing
Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979). Professor White argues the need for per se rules to
prohibit unfair interrogation methods. He notes the "unique police opportunity to exploit the
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B. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation
Chief Justice Warren recognized that modem police interroga-
tion techniques can be extremely sophisticated. The Court found that
law enforcement techniques are rarely physically oriented.4" Rather,
the police will often attempt to overcome a suspect's will through psy-
chological techniques.46 Later, the Court also recognized that the
police are able to provoke a response through means other than
"express questioning."47 The Court believed coercion was greatest
when counsel was not present during a custodial interrogation.4
To overcome these psychological interrogation techniques, the
Court in Miranda held that a suspect has a fifth and fourteenth
amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interroga-
tion.49 That right may be exercised before or during any part of an
interrogation.5° Once a suspect has received the Miranda warnings,
he may voluntarily waive his right to have an attorney present, and to
make a statement or answer any questions that law enforcement per-
sonnel present.5 The Court reasoned that a suspect's voluntary con-
fession is not compelled and is, therefore, admissible.2
C. Waiving Fifth Amendment Rights
A court weighs the totality of factors presented in the case to
determine the validity of an individual's waiver of his fifth amend-
ment rights. 53 A court must additionally consider the "background,
[incarcerated] suspect's vulnerability" by "select[ing] people with whom he can confide." Id. at
605.
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. The Court stated that "'[s]ince Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that
the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' " Id. at
448 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
46. White, supra note 37, at 1211. See also Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 Sup. Cr. REV. 99, 113 (Miranda guards against the possibility of the coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogations eliciting untrue and unreliable statements.). For an
older decision underscoring the Court's long-time concern with psychologically induced
confessions, see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
47. The Court stated that the Miranda safeguards come into play with the "functional
equivalent" of express questioning. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-66.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Id. at 473-74.
51. Id. at 475-76, 479.
52. Id. at 478.
53. A waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. Voluntariness
implies the waiver "was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception. . . . [T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."
Moran v. Burbine, 54 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4267 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485).
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experience and conduct of the accused."'5 4 In Edwards v. Arizona,55
the Court held that a waiver is valid where a suspect who had previ-
ously invoked his right to have counsel present during interrogation,
initiates further discussion about the offense with the police.56 The
state, however, will not meet its heavy burden of proving a "knowing
and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"57
when the suspect merely responds to police initiated questioning or
conduct designed to elicit a response.5 8
The Edwards Court noted that additional safeguards are needed
when a suspect requests counsel, but left unresolved the issue of what
constitutes an intelligent waiver.59 Generally, the right to counsel is
recognized as a personal one, belonging to the accused and not his
attorney. 60 The Edwards Court cited various lower court opinions
with approval which held that an individual, acting alone, may waive
a previously invoked right to counsel, even when he has never actu-
54. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See also United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 145 (8th Cir. 1980)
(waiver determined on facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the suspect's
background, experience, and conduct); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (fifth amendment does not
bar voluntary confessions). Lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration is strong
evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights as are threats, trickery, or evidence
that a suspect was cajoled into a waiver. Id. at 476. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 729-
30 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (A juvenile's request to speak with probation officer serves
as both an attempt to receive advice and a general invocation of the right to remain silent.).
55. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
56. Id. at 484-85. Prior to Edwards, the Court applied a voluntariness standard. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 475, 479; see also U.S. v. Hackley, 636 F.2d 493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (courts look
to totality of circumstances to determine if statement was made voluntarily and whether
confession was product of rational intellect and free will); U.S. v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 145 (8th
Cir. 1980) (government has heavy burden to prove suspect has voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights).
The voluntariness, or Johnson, rule required both knowledge and intent. Rubin, Toward a
General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 491-92 (1981). See also Case Comments,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Knowledge of Counsel's Efforts to Contact Suspect Not Requiredfor
Knowing Waiver of Fifth Amendment Rights - State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982), 17
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 313, 317 n.26 (1983) (reviewing the waiver issue); Recent Decisions,
Constitutional Law -- Sixth Amendment - Waiver of the Right to Counsel, 18 DuQ. L. REV.
999, 1001 (1980) (resolution of waiver issue requires totality of circumstances analysis which
provides greater flexibility than a per se rule).
57. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
58. Id. at 484-85. But see United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1307 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983) (defendant voluntarily waived both his right to remain silent
and to counsel where after invoking them he subsequently initiated contact with the police and
again refused the presence of counsel); McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 802-03 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1982) (government met its "heavy" burden of proving
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present during
interrogation where he repeatedly refused this right).
59. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 & n.8.
60. See infra notes 61-62.
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ally conversed with his attorney.61 If the Church court had found
custodial interrogation, it would have had to address the validity of
Michael's waiver in the absence of counsel. After years of conflicting
lower court opinions,62 the Supreme Court recently settled this issue
in Moran v. Burbine.6 3 In Burbine, the police interrogated the suspect
after informing the suspect's attorney that an interrogation would not
take place in her absence. The Supreme Court held that the police's
failure to inform the incarcerated suspect that the attorney retained
for him was seeking to counsel him, did not invalidate his waiver of
his fifth amendment right to counsel because Burbine had received
Miranda warnings before interrogation. 64 The Court saw the issue as
whether the police conduct "deprives a defendant of knowledge essen-
tial to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the conse-
quences of abandoning them."' 65  Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor said: "Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate
61. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. The Court cited cases that generally hold that a person
in custody who has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide he no
longer wishes to be represented by counsel. Id. See also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982)
(waiver of right to have counsel present at polygraph exam was knowing, intelligent and
voluntary where accused understood that right and was aware he could conclude questioning
at any time); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
873 (1972) (court rejected contention that defendant may not be interviewed without prior
notice to or consent of attorney).
62. Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (failure to inform counsel of
an impending examination deprived defendant of assistance of counsel at a crucial time);
United States ex rel. Magoon v. Reincke, 304 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (D. Conn. 1968), affid, 416
F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1969) (when counsel asks police to cease interrogation until he is present, he
speaks "in behalf of his client" and all interrogation must cease until the attorney is present).
"[T]o admit into evidence statements thereafter obtained from the accused by police
interrogation in the absence of counsel violates the defendant's constitutional rights." Id. at
1019; Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), petition for cert. filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. July 23, 1985) (No. 85-23) (where police know that retained counsel is
present, seeking to provide legal assistance, failure to inform suspect of this fact renders any
statements derived thereafter inadmissible); Elfadl v. State, 61 Md. App. 132, -, 485 A.2d
275, 280-81 (1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. July 23, 1985) (No. 85-24)
(same); Dunn v. State, 696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3272 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1985) (No.85-587) (failure to inform suspect that attorney
retained by family was attempting to offer assistance invalidated waiver of fifth amendment
rights). But see Fuentes v. Moran, 733 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1984) (where police did not inform
defendant that his attorney had made inquiry regarding his status, interrogation without
presence of counsel is permissible, but heavy burden rests on government to demonstrate that
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retain counsel); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (statement,
admission, or confession by a defendant who is represented by an attorney is admissible even
though law enforcement personnel did not timely advise the attorney of proposed
interrogation).
63. 54 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485).
64. Id. at 4268.
65. Id.
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deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's decision
to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of the
incident."66
D. A Note on the Sixth Amendment
Once an adversarial relationship begins, the sixth amendment
offers the protection of counsel to a criminal defendant.67 Courts gen-
erally limit a suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel to a critical
stage in the pretrial proceedings.68 The most notable critical stage
periods include those in which a formal charge, indictment, prelimi-
nary hearing, or arraignment has taken place.69 Courts apply a higher
66. Id. at 4267. The potential for abuse of the Court's holding is alarming. As Justice
Stevens expressed in dissent: "The possible reach of the Court's opinion is stunning. For the
majority seems to suggest that police may deny counsel all access to a client who is being
held." Id. at 4279 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The amendment is effective whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
defense. Maine v Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484 (1985) (sixth and fourteenth amendments
guarantee right to assistance of counsel in adversarial system of criminal justice); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967) (accused has right to counsel at all critical stages once
prosecution initiated).
68. A critical stage is a specific pretrial event in a criminal prosecution. Moss & Kilbreth,
Maine v. Moulton: The Sixth Amendment and Deliberate Elicitation: The State's Position, 23
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 59, 63 (1985). The sixth amendment attaches at or after initiation of
adversary proceedings. United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
69. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (limiting sixth amendment right to
counsel to period "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment"). In Massiah v. United States, the Court held that the admission of statements
into evidence that the prosecution "deliberately elicited" from the accused in the absence of his
attorney after indictment or arraignment violated the suspect's sixth amendment right to
counsel. 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964). Massiah involved the use of an undercover agent in a
non-custodial setting. Several months later in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court, at first glance,
seemed to broaden the application of the sixth amendment. 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964). The state
had not begun adversarial proceedings against Escobedo when the police denied him the
opportunity to consult with his attorney. Id. at 481-82, 485. While the narrow holding was
tied to its facts, the majority suggested that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment
may attach prior to indictment. The precise period, however, was unclear. The majority
opinion implied that the right attaches as the process shifts from an "investigatory"
relationship to an "adversarial" one and the purpose of the questioning is to elicit a confession.
Id. at 486-87, 490-91. In a compelling dissent, Justice Stewart stressed that one's sixth
amendment rights commence with formal, meaningful judicial proceedings. Id. at 493-94
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In Kirby, a sharply divided Court endorsed Justice Stewart's line and
limited Escobedo to its distinct facts. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. See W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 37, at 460-66. But cf. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 81 (right to counsel should not
turn on arbitrary point); Note, Pretrial Rights to Counsel Under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments: A Distinction Without a Difference, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 79, 106-07 (right to
counsel should extend to pre-arraignment period).
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standard to the waiver of one's sixth amendment rights than to the
waiver of one's fifth amendment rights.7" This is in part due to a
belief that a violation of the sixth amendment is more severe.7 In
Burbine and Innis, the Court noted that the fifth and sixth amend-
ment definitions of interrogation are not interchangeable because the
policies behind each are distinct.72 Moreover, while the custodial
interrogation tests for the two amendments are similar they are not
the same.73 The sixth amendment right to counsel is not violated
without interrogation or a deliberate effort to elicit information from
the suspect.74 Until recently, courts permitted the police to question a
70. Miranda warnings alone do not suffice to meet the "higher" standard of a sixth
amendment waiver of the right to counsel. United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.
1983); Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980).
71. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967). See supra note 67.
72. Moran v. Burbine, 54 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4269-70 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485)
(purpose of sixth amendment is to assure that accused is not left alone during criminal
prosecution); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980). At least one commentator
argued that the right to counsel in both the fifth and sixth amendment contexts protects the
accused from unfair law enforcement methods. Note, supra note 69, at 102-04 (rights of both
amendments promote same objective and should provide similar protection).
73. For an explanation of the sixth amendment test, see supra note 67 & infra note 74 and
accompanying text. The fifth amendment test is discussed in notes 34-44 and accompanying
text.
74. In sixth amendment cases where the government intentionally placed a person in a cell
in order to induce statements by another prisoner, courts have found the government conduct
to constitute a "deliberate elicitation" of incriminating information. Such statements,
therefore, are inadmissable into evidence. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1984)
(intentionally placing an informant in a cell to elicit inculpatory statements from a suspect
violates suspect's sixth amendment rights); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (informant not transformed into agent, but government conduct in deliberately eliciting
statements violated suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel). But cf. United States v.
Panza, 750 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1984) (no sixth amendment violation where informant acted on
own volition, rather than in response to government solicitation); Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d
132, 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983) (deliberate elicitation of comments by
"self-initiated" informant motivated by conscience did not violate suspect's sixth amendment
protection); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1981) (same).
In Brewer v. Williams, the Court held that a detective's comment directed to an arraigned
suspect, who had invoked his right to counsel, concerning the need for a proper Christian
burial for the victim constituted interrogation under the sixth amendment because the officer
"deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from" the suspect. 430 U.S. 387, 389
(1977). The defendant challenged his conviction on both fifth and sixth amendment grounds.
The Court stressed that sixth amendment "protection would [not] have come into play if there
had been no interrogation." Id. at 400. See also W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 37, at
460-66; White, supra note 37, at 1214-15. The Court's holding caused some confusion in the
lower courts. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
The Court clarified the issue with two 1980 decisions, Innis and United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264 (1980). In Henry, an informant was paid for information he gathered from
Henry who had been indicted and incarcerated, after the police directed the informant not to
question or initiate a discussion with the accused. Henry, 447 U.S. at 266. The Court held
that the government violated the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel "[b]y
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements
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suspect who had been indicted for an unrelated offense with respect to
his involvement in new criminal activity without infringing upon his
right to counsel. 7' In Maine v. Moulton,7 6 however, the Court appears
to have curtailed the breadth of that standard.
III. APPLYING THE MIRANDA-INNIS SAFEGUARDS TO CHURCH
A. Fifth Amendment Rights at Stake
The Church court held that Michael Church could not claim an
infringement of his sixth amendment right to counsel because the
state had not yet initiated adversarial judicial proceedings relating to
the murder charge against him." Church had only been arraigned for
assisting his brother's escape. Indeed, throughout his incarceration in
the local jail, he was at most, merely a suspect in the murder until the
time of his confession. Even though the court had arraigned Church
without the assistance of counsel." Id. at 274. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Innis decision.
75. Prior to 1985, appellate courts did not grant indicted defendants broad protection for
unrelated criminal activity. United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 831 (1982) (no Massiah prohibition against the use of statements that relate to a new
crime); United States v. Capo, 693 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1092 (1983) (where defendant was arrested and indicted for one offense, incriminating
evidence relating to another offense obtained in absence of counsel is admissible); United States
v. Merritts, 527 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1975) (prosecution may use post-indictment statements,
made without the assistance of counsel, which refer to new crime).
76. 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985). The Court held that:
Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must...
honor it .... [A]t the very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative
obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the
protection afforded by the right to counsel.
... [K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the
accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's
obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the
intentional creation of such an opportunity. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment
is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly
circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation
between the accused and a state agent.
... The police have an interest in the thorough investigation of crimes for
which formal charges have already been filed. They also have an interest in
investigating new or additional crimes .... To allow the admission of evidence
obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever
the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites
abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and
risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah.
Id. at 484-85, 487, 489. Apparently, the majority in Moulton refused to extend this new stan-
dard to fifth amendment cases. Id. at 489.
77. United States ex rel. Church v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1016 n.l (7th Cir. 1985).
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on the aiding and abetting charge,"8 his sixth amendment rights were
not at issue with respect to the murder because the police had not
charged him with that crime.
Once the court concluded that only Church's fifth amendment
rights were at issue, the court's primary concern was to determine
whether or not there was a "custodial interrogation." If there had not
been an interrogation, the court would not need to address the more
troubling waiver issue.' 9 While there was a certain degree of contro-
versy surrounding the facts of the case,80 the court concluded that
there was "no reason to go behind the state courts' description of the
events"" because the petitioner did not challenge the state court's
findings of fact. 2 Still, it is not clear whether the court considered all
78. Id. at 1017.
79. For a discussion of fifth amendment waiver, see notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
80. The Church brothers claimed that the police questioned Michael and called him a liar
before he actually wrote out the confession. Each court, however, chose to believe the police
version. United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1018 (7th Cir. 1985).
The police account of events is as follows: Michael told the detective he wanted to make a
statement. The detective read him the Miranda warnings and Michael waived all rights
including the right to counsel. The officers then departed, leaving Michael with pencil and
paper on which he wrote an eleven page inculpatory statement. Id.
81. Church, 771 F.2d at 1018.
82. Unless subject to attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), a federal court is bound to accept
the state court's historical findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for
the writ and the State... were parties.... shall be presumed to be correct, unless
the applicant shall establish ... or the respondent shall admit -
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the fact finding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or ... the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as
a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record: . . . [u]nless the existence of one or more of the circumstances ... set
forth . . . is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted . . . the
burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish that the factual determination
by the State court was erroneous.
Id.
In Sumner v. Mata, Justice Rehnquist held that the federalism policy behind § 2254(d)
requires federal courts to defer to the state courts' factual determinations, especially where the
federal court and the state appellate court evaluate an identical record. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
Recently, the Court reiterated this concept in Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985). "The
1986] FIFTH AMENDMENT CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 847
of the state trial court's findings of fact in light of the Miranda-Innis
definition of custodial interrogation.83 That is, the court looked at
only some of the facts and applied only random portions of the
Miranda and Innis decisions rather than looking at the overall policy
rationales that formed the basis of these decisions.
In determining whether custodial interrogation exists, courts
should consider the overall policy behind the safeguards of Miranda
and its progeny. 4 The Seventh Circuit in Church ignored the
Miranda and Innis decisions' concern with the potential for subtle
coercion when police conduct custodial interrogations in the absence
of counsel. Likewise, the court's analysis sidestepped the Miranda
Court's concern with sophisticated, psychologically-induced interro-
gation methods that law enforcement personnel utilize to provoke
self-incriminating statements. The Church court also negated the
Miranda Court's concern with the voluntary nature of confessions.8 5
Instead, the court concentrated only on official police trickery86 and
in finding none, held that there was no interrogation.
It is clear that Michael Church's confession met the first part of
the Miranda-Innis custodial interrogation test. Throughout the period
in controversy, Michael was incarcerated in the local jail.87 Applying
the California v. Beheler88 standard, even though the police had not
formally arrested Church for the murder, his restraint on the aiding
and abetting charge was sufficient to constitute custody for fifth
amendment purposes. Michael Church, therefore, was "in-custody"
for the purpose of receiving the Miranda warnings.
Given the facts of this case, the interrogation analysis is signifi-
cantly more complex than the custody test. Courts have recognized
that not every attempt to elicit information should be regarded as tan-
tamount to an interrogation.89 The officers did not explicitly question
law is therefore clear that state court findings on such matters [interrogation circumstances]
are conclusive on the habeas court if fairly supported in the record and if the other circum-
stances enumerated in § 2254(d) are inapplicable." Id. at 453.
83. For a discussion of the facts that were before the court, see supra notes 8, 80 and
INTRODUCTION.
84. For a discussion of the policy of fifth amendment procedural safeguards see supra
notes 21-27 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 413
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969) ("Thus, Miranda has created a presumption of
coercion by the mere presence of the dual factors of a police-initiated interrogation and the
defendant's being in custody.")
85. See supra notes 23-26 accompanying text.
86. Church, 771 F.2d at 1019.
87. Id. at 1017.
88. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
89. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980); see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
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Michael once he invoked his Miranda rights.9" The case does, how-
ever, present police conduct which could rise to the level of the "func-
tional equivalent" of express questioning.
Placing Kelly in Michael's cell when the police knew he was
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from his
brother could be construed as custodial interrogation. Kelly told
Michael that the only way to help their younger brother was for
Michael to make a statement.9" The court, however, inferred that
Kelly's only motivation in eliciting Michael's confession was a desire
for the three brothers to be incarcerated in the same cell. In fact, the
court stated that this was the only apparent promise that the police
made to Kelly.92 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, reasoned that the
police action in putting the two brothers together was not an interro-
gation, even though it was not normal police conduct.93
The court stated that Kelly was merely acting on behalf of the
Church family and concluded that the only police intent, if any, in
allowing Kelly to enter Michael's cell was to ease the concern of the
Church family for young Casey.94 Nonetheless, it is apparent from
Kelly's statement to Michael that Kelly may have been motivated by
a greater desire than the court implied. When compared to other cases
in which family-induced confessions occurred, it is not at all certain
that Kelly was acting solely on his family's behalf.95 It is clear from
the police's prior attempts to question Michael that they strongly
desired his statement.96
Church presents a distinct contrast to other cases of family-
supra note 37, at 505-06 (police may ask innocuous questions not intended to elicit inculpatory
remarks).
90. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1019.
93. Id. at 1018.
94. Id. at 1019-20.
95. Two fifth amendment waiver cases are illustrative of factual situations in which the
family induces the confession. In Watkins v. Callahan, the police advised Watkins of his rights
and eventually allowed the suspect to use a telephone to call his attorney after he requested the
assistance of counsel. 724 F.2d 1038, 1040 (1st Cir. 1984). Rather than calling counsel,
Watkins, acting independently of official control or suggestions, spoke with his mother and
sister for thirty minutes. Id. at 1040. He then informed the officer that he would give a further
statement. Id. The court admitted his post-telephone inculpatory comments holding that
there was no denial of his fifth amendment rights. Id. at 1042-43. In United States v. Shaw,
after the repeated requests of the suspect's parents, FBI agents reluctantly met with a suspect
who had previously asserted his right to counsel. 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1419 (1984). The suspect stated that he, not his parents, initiated the interview. Id.
at 376. The court admitted his inculpatory statements. Id. at 380.
96. Michael was a prime suspect. The police, however, had been unable to obtain
inculpatory statements through direct questioning. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
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induced confessions. In Church, the police controlled the environ-
ment that led to the questioning.97 In other cases, either the family
never spoke with the police, or if they had, the suspect was aware of
that fact and made it clear that it was he, not the family, that had
initiated the conversation that led to the inculpatory remarks. 98 The
Church court did find that it was Michael who commenced contact
with the police. This contact, however, occurred only after Kelly's
private discussions with the police and only after he had called the
police to Michael's cell. 99 Additionally, at the time of contact, the
effects of the coercive environment were present and controlling. The
facts of this case are therefore inapposite to those in other family-
induced confession cases.
There are two alternative ways of viewing the police conduct. In
one sense, Kelly became a police agent. In another, the police trans-
formed him into a dupe. The Seventh Circuit rejected the former,
finding that the detectives did not make, nor intend to make Michael
their agent."°° Nevertheless, the court could have viewed Kelly as a
police dupe under the following scenario: If Michael was particularly
susceptible to his older brother's influence, it is not at all difficult to
imagine the extent of Kelly's ability to affect Michael's behavior. The
police should have known Michael was susceptible to his older
brother's influence because he had already assisted him in completing
one crime.' 0 ' The police would therefore need little ingenuity to
manipulate the older brother's influence because they were well aware
that the parents had discussed their deep concern for Casey with
Kelly. 012 Hence, under this scenario, the family concern for Casey
would be transformed into police conduct constituting the "funda-
mental equivalent" of express questioning. Rather than serving as a
police agent, Kelly in a sense became a dupe for the police in an effec-
tive interrogation ploy that took advantage of familial trust. 3 If the
dupe proposition is correct, improper police conduct is evident
97. From the time of Kelly's arrest, police actions set events in motion that eventually led
to Kelly's virtual promise that he would induce a statement from Michael.
98. See supra note 95.
99. See supra text accompanying note 11.
100. Church, 771 F.2d at 1018-19. In his argument before the Seventh Circuit, appellant
put forth the theory that the police used Kelly as an agent. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-
Appellant at 24-26, United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.
1985).
101. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
102. Id.
103. The police controlled Kelly's influence in the sense that they did not have to place
Kelly in Michael's cell. Additionally, the police could have removed Kelly from the cell at any
time. In his dissenting opinion in Innis, Justice Stevens noted that criminal suspects are
susceptible to appeals to their conscience. He stated that an often successful interrogation
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
because through Kelly, the police elicited self-incriminating informa-
tion from Michael after he invoked his rights. The Court, therefore,
should have excluded Michael's statement.
Professor Kamisar recognized that "[i]t is the impact on the sus-
pect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police
custody-each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties pro-
duced by the other-that.., makes 'custodial police interrogation' so
devastating.'"' Even if Kelly was only a dupe for the police, the
"interplay" between custody and conduct constituting interrogation
was present. Michael was isolated in a jail cell unable to prevent the
police from influencing him to confess."15 While the average suspect
has the right to terminate a police interrogation at any time, 0 6
Michael did not have this vital Miranda right. Even though Michael
did not have to talk to his brother, he was, as the police knew, partic-
ularly subject to his brother's influence. The court, however, did not
consider Kelly's affidavit in which he claimed to have "pressured"
Michael both to waive his rights and to make the statement. 107
Because Michael could not prevent the police's use of Kelly, nor
understand the nature of Kelly's ultimate motivations, it was possible
to quickly and effectively overwhelm his will in contravention of the
Miranda safeguards.10 8  Under this "dupe-theory," the custodial
interrogation test would be met if the police knew Michael was amen-
able to his older brother's influence. The court would then have had
to reach the issue of whether Michael's waiver was knowing and
effective.
On one hand, under Professor Kamisar's theory,10 9 the facts of
this case most likely did not present the type of coercive environment
which Miranda and Innis sought to safeguard." 10 A strict view of the
Miranda line of cases would hold that a coercive environment did not
technique is an appeal to a suspect's sense of morality. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
315 (1980).
104. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 63.
105. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017-18.
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
107. Church, 771 F.2d at 1018.
108. In discussing the indispensibility of the right to counsel, Miranda warned of in-custody
situations where interrogators could overbear the suspect's will. Miranda sought to assure that
one's right to remain silent "remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
109. See supra note 37.
110. In Miranda and its companion cases, each defendant, while in custody, was questioned
by a prosecuting attorney, police officer, or a detective. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. Under a
narrow view of Miranda, or one such that Professor Kamisar posits, the interplay between
compulsion and custody would exist only if Michael perceived official compulsion through
Kelly's provocation. See supra note 37.
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exist because Michael was not under the impression that the police
were compelling him to testify. Without some compulsive influence,
the fifth amendment procedural safeguards do not come into effect.
Under a similar theory, if an objective observer were to view
Kelly's conversations solely as a family matter, as did the court, I t' the
only conversation upon which an interrogation can be measured is
Michael's request to make a statement. Here, the objective observer
would find no interrogation and the confession would be admissible.
On the other hand, by applying an objective theory similar to
Professor White's, 1 2 it is possible for an objective observer to infer
that Kelly's remarks (if he was a dupe) were reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response. The feasibility of this conclusion is practi-
cal given the abnormal nature of the police conduct. 1 3 Under this
theory, therefore, a violation of Michael's previously invoked fifth
amendment rights occurred.
B. The Waiver Issue
Assuming the court had found that Church had been interro-
gated, it would then have had to determine whether his subsequent
waiver was valid. Prior to being left with pencil and paper, the detec-
tives gave Church the Miranda warnings and told him that the Court
had appointed a lawyer for him." t' Since the attorney did not know
until the day before the confession that he was representing Church
on the escape charge, it is more than reasonable to assume that
Church did not actually know who would be providing legal assist-
ance to him." 5 While reading the warnings shortly before Church
wrote the confession, the police neglected to inform the suspect that
his attorney planned to meet with him the following morning and that
the police had agreed to his attorney's instruction not to speak with
him. Moreover, the attorney was not informed that his client planned
111. Church, 771 F.2d at 1019-20.
112. White, supra note 37, at 1232. For a discussion of Professor White's test, see supra
note 37.
In another article, Professor White discussed a hypothetical in which a defendant could
invoke Spano v. New York, to claim that his confession was involuntary because government
deceit effectively precluded a "rational choice." White, supra note 44, at 605-06 (discussing
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)).
113. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
114. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017, 1020.
115. Church's attorney had agreed to the police's request on Saturday to represent his client
in questioning relating to the murder. The police were well aware that he would not be able to
meet with his client until early Monday morning at the earliest. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to make a statement.' 16 The facts of the case present the question of
whether Church's "waiver" was intelligent and knowing, and thereby,
valid." 7 The waiver must be considered in light of the fact that
Church was not fully informed of circumstances that may have
affected his ability to understand the nature of his decision to relin-
quish his previously asserted refusal to talk with the police." 8 Had
the Seventh Circuit reached the waiver issue, it is probable that they
would have had to address a similar issue to that framed in
Burbine. 19 Even though the Supreme Court has now answered the
waiver issue, the need for a revised custodial interrogation standard is
still evident.
IV. COMMENT-THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD
Church highlights the difficulties associated with the current defi-
nition of custodial interrogation. Even if one agrees with the Church
court that under current law there was no custodial interrogation, the
case presents a disturbing loophole in the interpretation of the
Miranda safeguards.
While Church was incarcerated, the police developed evidence
implicating him in the murder.'2 ° He became a prime murder suspect
while being held for another offense. Yet, the evidence relating to the
murder may have been insufficient to file formal charges against him.
Even if there had been sufficient evidence, it was possible for the
police to delay indicting Church until they attained his statement.
The Church decision demonstrates the ease with which law
enforcement personnel may circumvent the current custodial interro-
gation standards. Both jurists and commentators recognize that the
the law enforcement community can manipulate the start of judicial
proceedings. ' 2' This capacity may provide the government with the
ability to establish arbitrary events that trigger fifth amendment pro-
tection. For that reason, there is a dangerous threat to the exercise of
one's fifth amendment constitutional rights to counsel and silence.
Professor Kamisar writes that the sixth amendment right to counsel
116. People v. Church, 102 I11. App. 3d 155, 158, 429 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1981).
117. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
118. The Court in Burbine addressed a very similar factual situation. In dissent, Justice
Stevens wrote: "Police interference with communications between an attorney and his client
violates the due process requirements of fundamental fairness." Moran v. Burbine, 54
U.S.L.W. 4265, 4279 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. For a discussion of Burbine, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
120. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
121. Kamisar, supra note 28, at 81.
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should not turn on an arbitrary time.'22 Rather, he argues, "it should
accomodate both the government's need for evidence and a suspect's
need for 'a lawyer's help,' . . . It should concern itself with the 'overall
fairness' of the 'interrogation' and the inherent coercion or potential
for coercion in the situation."'' 2 3
Professor Kamisar's sixth amendment argument is applicable to
the fifth amendment cases. Courts should be more aware of the
unfairness and coercion that may result from the incarceration envi-
ronment. Church demonstrates a suspect's fundamental need for a
lawyer's help in a fifth amendment case. In a strict critical stage 24
analysis, the inquiry into Michael Church's involvement in the mur-
der was in an "investigatory" stage. Nonetheless, from the evidence
that the police developed, it is feasible to interpret Church's position
as interim, in a sense, a "pre-accusatory" stage."' The loophole
presented in the Church decision is an inherent unfairness in the cur-
rent state of the law relating to custodial interrogations. The process
is unfair because Church's right to counsel had not formally
attached, 26 under either the fifth or sixth amendments. He stood
alone, at what was for him, a critical and lasting stage in his life. 127
The decision demonstrates the need for a refined definition of
custodial interrogation. A more rigid standard is needed to assure
that government action, beyond normal police procedures, does not
derogate one's previously asserted fifth amendment rights. 28 The
standard would be applicable even though the police conduct may not
meet a stringent reading of the custodial interrogation test. This pro-
posal does not suggest that the police should have the responsibility of
preventing family-induced confessions which the suspect's family
actually induces. Rather, the proposal suggests that the police should
not be able to elicit confessions through family members.
The standard advocated here would require the police to "scru-
pulously honor" both a suspect's right to remain silent 29 and, his pre-
122. Id.
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. For a definition of a critical stage, see supra note 68.
125. The police knew Church was present at the murder. Nevertheless, they still needed to
determine his role in the crime. It is reasonable to assume police questioning would contain
some level of accusation. The case, therefore, may have been beyond a mere investigatory
stage in the proceedings.
126. The court held that Miranda offered no protection because there was no custodial
interrogation. Church, 771 F.2d at 1017.
127. People v. Church, 102 Ill. App. 3d 155, 157, 429 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1981).
128. "Apparent attempts to elicit information from a suspect after he has invoked his right
to cut off questioning necessarily demean that right .. " Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
311 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court held that statements elicited after a suspect had
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viously asserted right to counsel. Confessions would not be
admissible if either government agents, or individuals duped into
assisting the police, induced the suspect to confess. The standard
would require courts to skeptically view a suspect's statements ren-
dered in the absence of counsel. 130 A rule of this nature would assure
that the Miranda safeguards, which are designed to protect a suspect's
fifth amendment rights will not turn on the effectiveness of the gov-
ernment in circumventing the current rules.
131
Any proposal altering constitutional safeguards should be closely
scrutinized. Perhaps the best way to measure the necessity of any rule
is to balance its advantages or disadvantages against the various social
policies that the rule will affect. 32 Using this analysis, one must bal-
ance the necessity for effective law enforcement against both the "pro-
phylactic" rules designed to safeguard the fifth and sixth amendments
and any deterrent effect the exclusion of statements will have on the
government. Critics of the suggested rule may charge that it will lead
to undue interference with society's overwhelming interest in effective
law enforcement. Moreover, proponents of a narrow reading of the
Miranda and Innis tests may argue that the suggested standard
imposes too strict a restraint in gathering necessary evidence.
1 33
The "New York Rule" provides that a suspect may not waive his
right to counsel in the absence of his attorney even when interrogation
is on a charge unrelated to the charge for which counsel was
retained.' 34 This rule is helpful in determining the social costs of pro-
elected to remain silent were inadmissible unless the police scrupulously honored the suspect's
decision. 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).
130. Justice White stated that when an individual expresses his desire to consult with
counsel, he expresses the view that he is not competent to deal with law enforcement officials
"without legal advice." Moreover, "a statement without counsel's presence may properly be
viewed with skepticism." Id. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring).
131. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
132. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 479 (1981).
133. For a discussion of opposing theories, see infra notes 135, 136.
134. New York courts have developed the "New York Rule" based on the state
constitution. This rule prohibits the state from questioning a client in the absence of counsel
regarding "matters encompassed by representation." Kamisar, supra note 28, at 88 (quoting
People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 622-23, 357 N.E.2d 955, 963-64, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299, 307-08
(1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting)). See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (suspect may not waive counsel in absence of attorney even when
interrogation unrelated to charge on which counsel retained); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) (individual held in custody may waive right to
counsel, only in presence of counsel); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (same).
The New York state constitution provides in relevant part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel
... nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
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viding suspects with greater assistance of counsel in interrogation and
waiver issues. Several critics have argued that the "New York Rule"
severely restricts the law enforcement community's ability to obtain
confessions from suspects in the absence of counsel. According to
these opponents, the decisions creating the rule "sacrifice the effective
operation of the criminal justice system.... As a result, police efforts
to curb crime will be hindered." '135
The criticism appears to be reactionary. Despite the dicta of the
Burbine majority,'36 courts have found that rather than hindering law
enforcement efforts, the presence of counsel during questioning may
actually provide greater assistance to the government. 37 Indeed, a
standard such as that advocated here, which would require the police
to "scrupulously honor" a suspect's invocation of his right to counsel,
will not frustrate or burden proper law enforcement procedures. It
will simply emphasize that the police must give warnings to suspects
before interrogations, a duty with which they are well acquainted. 138
Moreover, such a standard will more closely guard the right to assist-
ance of counsel than the present standard now guarantees in a fifth
amendment case. The presence of counsel can in some circumstances
lead to greater responsibility on the part of all parties. 139 In the same
way, a broad reading of the Miranda-Innis custodial interrogation test
will promote, rather than hamper the production of reliable evidence.
It will add assurance that a suspect's right to counsel will not be abro-
gated. ° As Justice Goldberg so eloquently wrote, "[n]o system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
135. Note, The Expanding Right To Counsel in New York, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351, 353
(1982); see also United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the "New
York Rule"); Uviller, The Judge at the Cop's Elbow, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1971) (analysis
of the "New York Rule").
136. Justice O'Connor wrote that a rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an
attorney's efforts to contact him would substantially handicap the police while being of
minimal benefit in preventing coercion of suspects under the Fifth Amendment. Moran v.
Burbine, 54 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4268 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485).
137. The presence of counsel can mitigate the danger of untrustworthiness, reduce coercion,
guarantee accurate statements, and ensure that the prosecution correctly presents the
statements at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966). See also Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (reliability of law enforcement system diminished when
dependent upon confessions). A shifting majority of the Supreme Court has in recent years
argued against the dicta of the Miranda and Escobedo decisions. See Stone, supra note 46
(analyzing the Burger Court's treatment of Miranda).
138. In Fare v. Michael C., the Court stated that a precise custodial interrogation formula
benefits the police, the prosecution and the suspect. 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
139. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 185 (1st Cir. 1985).
140. See supra note 76. While the Moulton decision was not based on fifth amendment
grounds as were Church and Burbine, the policy concerns expressed in Justice Brennan's
majority opinion are similar to those advocated here for fifth amendment purposes.
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consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these
rights." ''
JAMES A. WEINKLE*
141. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
* In honor and in memory of those whose inspiration have made it possible, and with
gratitude to my parents for their support and encouragement. Special appreciation to Elisa
Fuller and Steven Naturman.
[Vol. 40:833
